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A Man Alone: Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League’s Support for the 
British during World War II 
“The war which nobody wanted turned out to be a blessing.”1 This statement by 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah shortly near the end of World War II reflects the importance that the 
leader of the All-India Muslim League placed upon the war. Yet historians have relegated the 
League’s participation in the conflict. Indian participation in World War II is often relegated to 
accounts of individual soldiers or broad summarizes of the service of Indian regiments and their 
integration with the battle plans of Western powers. Part of this is likely due to strains of 
Western superiority, which place non-Western forces on the edges history. However historians 
have also compartmentalized this episode. Much scholarship exists during this time period that 
examines Indian politics as it relates to the independence movement or the creation of Pakistan. 
But there has been a seeming resistance to integrate the impact of World War II with domestic 
Indian politics. The one notable exception is Yasmin Khan’s The Raj at War. However this 
work, while aimed at examining the entire subcontinent, is primarily focused on the politics of 
the Indian National Congress and relegates the League to only a few pages. Yasmin Khan’s 
explanation for the League’s actions is also unsatisfying as she simply paints the League as 
acting solely in a contrarian manner to Gandhi and the Congress, the organization is relegated to 
functioning merely as a face for minor parties. 
The lack of scholarship on League support for World War II is rather notable as such 
support calls for explanation. The League was the most notable Indian independence 
organization to support the British and the organization’s leaders seemingly saw such support as 
compatible with the organization’s overriding goal of achieving Indian independence. Jinnah was 
                                                          
1 Yasmin Khan, The Raj at War : A People’s History of India’s Second World War, (London, The Bodley Head, 2015), 
135. 
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obviously aware of the Gandhian criticism of the war as a colonial conflict yet he still led the 
League in supporting the war. Even stranger, the League had historical motive to be skeptical of 
such support. In World War I Indian Muslim Leaders had hinged their support for the British on 
the agreement that, in return, the British would respect the Ottoman caliphate and Muslim holy 
cities in Arabia. Yet, during the war, the British supported Arab revolts in Mecca against the 
caliphate, and proclaimed the Balfour Declaration in support of creating a Jewish Homeland on 
Muslim Majority lands of Palestine. Upon the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the British Forces 
invaded Istanbul, encourage the Greek invasion of Anatolia, and rejected claims of self-
determination for Turkey. Against the perceived British betrayal of Indian Muslims, the post-war 
era witnessed a large Muslim and Hindu mobilization in India to support the Turkish War for 
Independence. General British abandonment of its promises to Muslim populations of India 
caused dismay among the Empire’s Muslim subjects and a feeling of betrayal. There was thus 
plenty of motive for Jinnah and the League to not support the British in World War II. Yet they 
did and this contradiction is one that historians seem to have ignored. 
This thesis fills this historical gap and craft a motive for League support that can explain 
the seeming contradiction of its actions. Crucial for understanding this is Ayesha Jalal’s The Sole 
Spokesman. In particular, Jalal’s view of Jinnah’s role in the creation of Pakistan. It should of 
course be noted that Jalal’s work is no longer the domineering force it once was and several 
historians have critiqued her argument. This thesis takes such views into account and 
incorporates such voices like Christoph Jaffrelot. However Jalal is an important part of my work 
and in many ways this thesis helps update her work by using the League’s support for the war as 
a way to answer several deficiencies in her book. 
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 Perhaps the most common criticism of Jalal that I want to answer is her depiction of 
Jinnah and the creation of Pakistan as ultimately something that occurs due to forces outside his 
control.2 In examining Jinnah’s decision to offer wartime support, my thesis crafts of view of 
Jinnah that offers him more agency and situates later forces as partially as result of actions he 
took early. In this sense Jinnah is not only given a renewed sense of agency but the forces that 
created the conditions for Pakistan are explained. 
Another aspect that this thesis addresses is the dominance of hegemonic individuals in 
Pakistani politics. As Christoph Jaffrelot has noted, the contemporary state of Pakistan has often 
been vulnerable to the dominance of powerful singular figures. While I believe Jaffrelot is 
correct to trace part of this to the founding of the state, I believe that he does not focus enough on 
Jinnah’s role in the League. In examining the actions taken by Jinnah during World War II, it 
becomes apparent that the League President acted as a powerful central force in many ways a 
precursor to the strongman politics know seen in Pakistan.  
A final goal of this thesis is the importance of the individual in the world of politics. 
While this thesis is not in the discipline of political science, it doe rely heavily on concepts from 
the realism school of thought found in modern international relations theory. Yet at the same 
time as I use this model, I offer a rather sharp criticism of the belief that states are the primary 
actors, a key tenet of realism. In observing the actions taken by Jinnah and the ramifications this 
had on the creation of Pakistan it becomes apparent the realist model is too narrow and that 
individuals figures can have major impacts. In examining Jinnah and his impact on Pakistan I 
broaden the scope of realism. Through the actions of Jinnah and his impact upon the creation of 
                                                          
2 Thomas R. Metcalf, “Review of the Sole Spokesman,” The American Historical Review 92, no. 4 (1987): 1021. 
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Pakistan, I want to observe the ways in which a single individual can have an impact upon 
political parties, states, and even the international order. 
 League support of the British war effort is best understood as a strategy to achieve 
political goals. Jinnah used the League’s backing of the war to obtain guarantees from the 
British, safeguarding the future of the organization, while also using the war as an opportunity to 
secure his control over the party. To ensure that he was not opposed while perusing his goals, 
Jinnah secured cooperation within the League through the use of Islamic modernist themes and 
vocabulary to justify the wartime support. The first two chapters map closely onto chronology 
examining the bulk of World War II as well as a few preceding years. The third chapter, while 
loosely tied to the end of the war, zooms out and looks at the war as a whole. 
 In Chapter One the base is failure of the League in the 1937 election and the ways in 
which Jinnah tried to respond. Jinnah’s negotiations with the British to achieve concessions in 
return for wartime support make up the bulk of this chapter and I try to connect such concessions 
to League goals of representation and determination.  
 In Chapter Two, I examine the ways in which support for the war changed particularly 
due to Jinnah using the war as a tool for establishing himself as a sole power within the League. 
In particular I discuss the conflict between Jinnah and A.K. Fazlul Huq and the ways in which 
the war was used by Jinnah to eliminate rival powers. This chapter also establishes the ways in 
which the establishment of Jinnah created a more uniform party. 
 Chapter Three is loosely based on the end of the war for the League and how there was 
little desire among the League to go to war against Japan. The primary focus of this chapter is on 
exploring the influence of Islamic Modernism and Syed Ahmad Khan on wartime support. This 
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chapter continues the idea of a uniform party from the previous chapter by displaying the way in 
which this uniformity functioned in practice and what it meant for the League. 
 
Chapter One 
Political Problems and Promises: The Leverage of Wartime Support 
 The All-India Muslim League’s performance in the 1937 Provincial Election sum up the 
daunting issue that faced the organization. The one bright side was that the League was the 
second most popular party. The problem was that this only resulted in 106 of 1,585 seats.3 The 
Indian National Congress, the most popular party, won 707 total seats, with most of these being 
open contest seats. It also won about half of the seats reserved for Muslim candidates, a bitter pill 
for Jinnah.4 To top matters off for Jinnah and the League, the Congress formed the government 
in seven out of the eleven contested provinces with the remaining four provinces, all Muslim 
majority regions, going to provincial parties rather than the League.5 To even the most 
simpleminded political observers the message was clear: the League, in its current state, could 
not win elections. 
 The election of 1937 revealed the initial problem that would drive Jinnah and League 
leadership mad trying to find a solution. The need to win votes in the Muslim majority provinces 
represented the biggest challenge. Despite its name, the League had actually performed best in 
                                                          
3 Shiva Bajpai and Joseph Schwartzberg, A Historical Atlas of South Asia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/reference/schwartzberg/pager.html?object=260&view=text 
4 Ibid. Elections had been split into separate electorates since 1909. Seats were reserved in legislative assemblies 
for Muslims candidates and only Muslims voters could vote on them. The loss of such seats to the Congress truly 
underlines the lack of Muslims unity among voters. 
5 The League would eventually form the government in Bengal after the Congress refused to participate due to the 
war. However even then the League would need to form a coalition with Fazlul Huq’s Krishak Praja Party in which 
Huq, not a Leaguer, would be the executive head. 
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regions where Muslims were not a majority.6 Though it was slightly comforting that the League 
could compete with the Congress in minority regions, the outcome still challenged the League’s 
assertion that it represented all South Asian Muslims as it had failed to win any Muslim-majority 
region. For all the various motives that drove Jinnah’s actions, ranging from pride to faith, there 
can be no doubt that the political necessity of finding an answer to this problem loomed large. 
For after all, a political party that does not win elections is little more than a social club. 
 Such was the political climate upon the outbreak of World War II. Faced with the 
prospect of continued failure Jinnah made a strategic decision and declared the League a 
supporter of the British. This was not a unanimous decision, even among the League leadership, 
and Jinnah would spend time convincing allies that supporting the war was worth it while also 
refuting abuse hurled by members of the Congress. Yet in obtaining a list of guaranteed rights 
from the British government, Jinnah secured the short-term future of the League and bought for 
it time to construct a message that would hopefully unify South Asian Muslims. Such a message 
would eventually arise in the form of the demand for an independent Pakistan.7 But in 1937, such 
an idea was still in the future, and at the outbreak of the war it was the pre-war electoral struggles 
of the League that drove Jinnah to support the British war effort. In doing so, he hoped to secure 
for the party a political future by extracting valuable concessions of political representation and 
Muslim self-determination from the United Kingdom. 
Important Players 
 The most important player for the British in India was the Viceroy of India. Beginning 
his term in 1936, Victor Hope, 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow held the position until 1943. With the 
                                                          
6 Deepak Pandey, "Congress-Muslim League Relations 1937-39: 'The Parting of the Ways'," Modern Asian Studies 
12, no. 4 (1978): 629. 
7 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 4-5. 
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passage of the Government of India Act 1935 the Viceroy took on a role of oversized importance 
as the British representative. Now imparted with the goal of forming a federation of Indian 
states, the Viceroy became the main point of contact with national Indian parties like the League 
or Congress. With the start of the war and the British focus on the conflict, the Viceroy gained 
more prominence as the most important British executive still focused on India. The Viceroy was 
of course not the only British executive, each Indian province was given a governor. However 
with the increased importance of provincial legislatures under the Government of India Act, the 
role of provincial governor was one often ignored by the national parties. 
 Yet while the Viceroy was the most important point of contact and often served as the 
articulator of British views, the ultimate authority lay in the British government. Neville 
Chamberlain from 1937-1940 and Winston Churchill from 1940-1945 lead the government as 
Prime Minister for the most relevant periods for this thesis. With the power to pass binding 
legislation and the ultimate decision about the future of India, the British government had 
supreme power over India. However the war dominated the focus of the British government and 
thus most decisions were left to the Viceroy.8 Churchill in particular did not want to be distracted 
by Indian politics and aside from an attempt in 1942 to secure Congress wartime support, often 
ignored Indian leaders.9 This left considerable power to the Viceroy and it is not surprising that 
he was the British figure most contacted by the League. 
  The composition of the League was far more multifaceted. Jinnah was the leading figure 
of the All-India Muslim League Working Committee. This group, appointed by Jinnah, was the 
                                                          
8 Kenton J. Clymer, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anticolonialism: Another Look," Pacific 
Historical Review 57, no. 3 (1988): 265. 
9 Clymer, “Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anticolonialism: Another Look,” 265. 
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head of the entire organization and was how Jinnah exercised most of his authority.10 As head of 
the Working Committee Jinnah could lead in the dictating of policy and objectives allowing the 
leader to broad ability to achieve personal goals. This as further supported by Liaquat Ali Khan, 
a close ally of Jinnah and another member of the Working Committee. 
 However while Jinnah was leader of the League the organization had little power by 
itself. Having won no provincial governments outright, the League was forced to build coalitions 
with provincial parties. A.K. Fazlul Huq of the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal and Sikandar 
Hayat Khan of the Unionist Party in the Punjab are the two most relevant leaders. Both men lead 
their respective parties while also accepting membership into the League when they formed 
coalition governments.11 These provincial parties are what most fractured Jinnah’s power. Unlike 
the Indian National Congress, Jinnah was forced to work with leaders of others parties who had 
their own visions of a free India. Thus while Jinnah had firm control of the core of the League he 
had to compete with opposing figures. 
Plain Mr. Jinnah 
 As the dominant leader of the League, to understand Jinnah and his political goals is to 
understand League actions taken during the 1930s-1940s. It is thus useful to gain an 
understanding of Jinnah and his political beliefs before focusing specifically on League actions 
during World War. Jinnah’s primary political motivation was securing minority protections for 
South Asian Muslims which he often framed in terms of an equal share of power for Hindus and 
Muslims. 
                                                          
10 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 39-41. 
11 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 150-151. 
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An important factor for understanding Jinnah’s political views is acknowledging his 
negative assessment regarding the Congress, though Jinnah was not always distrustful of the 
opposing party. Initially a member of the Congress, Jinnah helped author the Lucknow Pact of 
1916 which relieved tensions between the League and Congress and set out a plan for power 
sharing. A supporter of early actions by Gandhi and the Congress, Jinnah clearly did not have an 
ideological aversion to the organization. His decision to leave is attributable to the rise of a new 
political fear, a growing concern of Hindu domination that would result from the open elections 
supported by the Congress.12 The Nehru Report, a Congress document that outlined a 
constitution for a free India, is often seen as the official split between Jinnah and the Congress. 
Jinnah’s famous Fourteen Points, delivered at the 1929 League session, explicitly reject the 
Nehru Report and reflect his concern over a Hindu hegemony. Guaranteed Muslim 
representation in the proposed central legislature and the continuation of separate elections are 
key aspects of Jinnah’s plan and indicate his fear of Hindu domination that would result from a 
purely democratic society. 
Jinnah’s political goals are best summarized by Christophe Jaffrelot when he describes an 
“obsession with parity” as being at the heart of Jinnah’s political actions.13 To achieve this goal, 
Jinnah framed his plans as answers to a supposed Hindu domination, often basing his arguments 
on ideas of equality between Muslims and Hindus. “Honorable settlement can only be achieved 
between equals” Jinnah stated at the 1937 Lahore conference. This idea is reiterated in another 
speech when Jinnah argues that Muslims should support the League as the equivalent 
organization to the Hindu Congress.14 The focus is clearly upon achieving a political parity 
                                                          
12 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 67. 
13 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 93-
94. 
14 Z.H. Zaidi, ed. Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, (Islamabad: Oxford University Press, 1993), 213. 
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between South Asian Hindus and Muslims. Indeed as some scholars have pointed out, the 
demand for Pakistan should be understood as simply another attempt of achieving parity.15 By 
framing Muslims and Hindus as distinct nations Jinnah managed to change the idea from 
minority and majority into one between two equal states; thereby logically asserting parity 
between the two groups. 
A Disparate Community 
 The source of the League’s struggles in elections lay in the lack of a cohesive Islamic 
political identity. Muslims in South Asia faced widely varied problems. With no singular identity 
or broadly popular message that the League could use, it struggled against more locally focused 
parties.16 In particular, Muslim majority regions like the Punjab had government structures 
created by the British that led to the rise of regional parties like the Unionist Party. Muslims 
could not be persuaded to support an organization that was broad-based when alternative 
narrowly focused parties offered avenues for political representation that were more closely 
tailored to the interests of the provincial voters. 
 The League could not simply declare itself as essentially an Islamic version of the 
Congress, an idea that to the casual observer might make sense. The Congress was not a Hindu 
organization which owed its success solely to promoting a Hindu nationalist vision. While it was 
correct that the Congress, under the de facto leadership of Gandhi, campaigned on the 
sovereignty issue to immense success, this success was primarily due to the personal popularity 
of Gandhi. The Congress was a Hindu-majority organization, but it was never a party focused 
solely on Hindu needs. Gandhi never wished to represent only Hindus and was careful to 
                                                          
15 Safoora Arbab, “Nonviolence, Pukhtunwali and Decolonization: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Khuda'i Khidmatgar 
Politics of Friendship.” Chapterin Muslims against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan, edited by 
Ali Usman Qasmi and Megan Eaton Robb, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 232. 
16 Pandey, "Congress-Muslim League Relations 1937-39,” 629. 
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emphasize the importance of minority faiths.17 The 1937 elections demonstrated that the 
Congress was quite popular among Muslims and thus if the League hoped to attract Muslims 
from the Congress it needed to give Muslims a reason to support the League rather than simply 
copy the Congress. 
 The difference between the League’s support in the central, Muslim-minority provinces 
and the peripheral, Muslim-majority provinces was an interesting feature of the League’s appeal. 
Oddly enough the party designed to represent all South Asian Muslims fared the best in Muslim-
minority regions where the main opposition was the Congress and not regional parties.18 The 
reason regional parties fared so well was mainly due to their ability to correctly target the needs 
of the individuals living in their provinces.19 When the British tried to implement a governmental 
system in Muslim regions, such as the Punjab, they often tried to do so based on a misguided 
concept of what comprised a traditional Muslim government. Yet the British, due to a 
misunderstanding of such a system, only focused on creating traditional peerage systems and 
hierarchies while ignoring religious justifications. Previous systems in these regions had relied 
on patronage and hierarchy systems which were justified through Islamic motifs like the 
caliphate.20 Lacking any religious backing, the British systems led to the rise of tensions among 
the populations. As David Gilmartin explains in his case study of the Punjab, with no religious 
underpinning for the rule of political elite, voters became disaffected with the political heirarchy. 
Regional parties arose to build of this anger and meet the new demand for political 
                                                          
17 Stanley Wolpert, Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 232. 
18 Bajpai and Schwartzberg, A Historical Atlas of South Asia, 222. 
19 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 17-22. 
20 David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 17-22. 
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representation from the impoverished classes in these regions.21 The Unionist Party in the 
Punjab, which campaigned on elite-rural tensions, or Fazlul Huq’s Krishak Praja Party in Bengal, 
which appealed to rural voters and relieving the debts of farmers, exemplify regional parties and 
the narrow targeting that allowed such them to flourish.22 
 Regional parties competed with the League for Muslim votes in every Muslim-majority 
region to varying degrees of success but all managed, at the very least, to be equal competitors 
with the League. With no way to effectively target each individual province the League was 
forced to hope that Muslims in the subcontinent could be persuaded to see themselves as a 
unified force. In the aftermath of the 1937 elections, it was clear that this hope had failed, and 
Jinnah was forced to take a hard look at the future of the League. In an address to the League 
Council in March of 1937 he emphasized the need for Muslims to unite as a cause of life or 
death.23 Yet the Congress had made no moves against Muslims, and as the success of the 
Congress among Muslim voters shows, South Asian Muslims clearly did not see the Congress as 
a bad option. Thus the only death that could result from Congress victories was that of the 
League itself. 
During the pre-war era in India it seems that religion was a relatively minor factor in 
voting habits as religiously based parties all struggled before the might of the Hindu-majority 
Congress.24 Yet it was not the unity of Hindus that made the Congress popular but the charisma 
of Gandhi, an observable fact found in the widespread appeal Gandhi had among people of all 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 D. Bandyopadhyay,"Preventable Deaths," Economic and Political Weekly 39, No. 30 (2004): 3347. 
23 Kishwar Sultana, Politics of the All-India Muslim League 1924-1940, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016), 171. 
24 “Hindu-Majority” refers to the breakdown of membership comprising the Congress and is not referring to a 
Hindu ideology that directed the Congress. It is important to make a distinction between the Hindu faith, 
comprised of a set of beliefs and rituals, and Hindu practitioners who are individual actors. Thus while the 
Congress membership was overwhelmingly Hindu practitioners, the ideology of the faith was never a political 
doctrine for the party. 
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faiths.25 In this area the league was hopelessly outmatched. Jinnah, with his western style of 
clothing and slightly elitist nature, could not match Gandhi’s traditional Indian clothing and 
stridently populist ideology. Jinnah’s message, while likely appealing to educated, wealthy elites, 
did not address larger issues like widespread poverty or low literacy rates. The overwhelming 
majority of Indian voters were not members of the economic or cultural elite and Gandhi’s focus 
on popular issues made the Congress a more attractive option.26 Thus, with no such popular 
leader, the League’s plan to stoke feelings of Islamic unity was misplaced and in the 1937 
elections the League suffered a disastrous defeat. The League needed time to craft a message that 
all South Asian Muslims could unite around. Jinnah and the League leadership searched for a 
path forward for the struggling political party. 
War and Protective Measures 
 In September 1939 Viceroy Victor Hope, 2nd Marquess of Linlithgow, declared India a 
combatant against Nazi Germany.27 After the failure of British officials to secure Congress 
support and an unwillingness from the British government to promise Indian independence in 
exchange for service, the Indian National Congress encouraged all of its members to resign from 
their political offices en masse. Yet where the Congress feared to tread Jinnah saw an 
opportunity to resolve his organization’s inability to win elections and secure a political future. 
Jinnah hoped that by supporting the war effort he might be able to extract concessions from the 
British government to protect the party’s future. However, numerous detractors, both within the 
League and without, threatened to stymie his strategy. Benefits gained from concessions would 
                                                          
25 Reel 22, IOR NEG 10781, Telegram to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, July 14, 1943. In contemporary writing on South 
Asia Viceroy Hope is typically referred to as either Viceroy Linlithgow or simply Linlithgow. For this rest of this 
paper I will maintain this practice. 
26 Narendra Subramanian, "Populism in India." SAIS Review of International Affairs 27, no. 1 (2007): 76-77. 
27 Sultana, Politics of the All-India Muslim League, 80. 
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mean little if the support needed to obtain them presented too much of a political liability so 
Jinnah had to look for ways to answer the criticism. Jinnah responded to non-League criticisms 
by framing wartime support as a response to the political dominance of the Congress. At the 
same time, he addressed worries of League members by occasionally acknowledging their 
concerns in order to clear a path for the League’s support for the war. 
First, Jinnah had to address criticisms from his opponents in the Congress and other 
parties. Although the mass resignation of the Congress in response to the declaration of war 
provided an opening for other political parties to seize control of the provincial governments, it 
also sent a powerful message. A refusal to support colonial orders was one of Gandhi’s most 
basic political strategies and a popular tactic among Indian voters. When India was declared a 
belligerent in WWII it was not altogether surprising that the Congress refused to support what it 
termed an “imperialist war.”28 However the Congress’s framing of the war as a colonialist 
endeavor did more than simply provide the organization with an opportunity to build political 
support by publicly resisting the British. Because the League supported the war, the Congress 
was able to mount a political attack against the League. By using the war as a chance to both 
refute the British and denigrate the League, the Congress positioned itself to further augment its 
support among the Indian electorate. Jinnah obviously could not let his already weak party be 
branded as a colonial sympathizer and thus needed to find a way to respond to Congress 
criticisms against of the League.29  
An anonymous letter to Jinnah from a Hindu in Bombay reflects the most extreme form 
of criticism aimed at League support of the war. Sarcastically calling Jinnah a “Muslim hero,” 
                                                          
28 Reel 17, IOR NEG 10776, Fragment of Letter to Jinnah. 
29 Reel 17, IOR NEG 10776, Fragment of Letter to Jinnah. 
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the letter proceeds to attack him as, “A SLAVE of the British master.”30 The letter ends by 
stating that the British care not for India and will ultimately betray the League. The fiery rhetoric 
in this letter is indicative of the intense disapproval that some non-League members felt toward 
Jinnah’s decision to offer wartime support. A prominent critic was Jawaharlal Nehru, president 
of the Congress. While not as fiercely hostile as the anonymous letter, Nehru was deeply critical 
of Jinnah’s position. A 1939 letter from Nehru expresses his belief that even though the League 
and Congress both claim to be Indian independence organizations, League support of England 
led him to believe that there was perhaps a “difference in political outlook and objectives 
(between the parties).”31 The fact that Nehru implied that the League did not earnestly wish to 
free India from colonial rule is indicative of the way that support for the British could be 
weaponized against the League and suggests why Jinnah needed to find an answer to it.  
Jinnah’s response to Congress’s criticism was to shift the focus of the war away from the 
British and onto the Congress. He accomplished this by framing the previous years of Congress 
rule as one of domination and recast League policies, including support for the war, as a response 
to such oppression rather than genuine support for the British. Jinnah’s announcement of a Day 
of Deliverance captures this strategy quite nicely. After the mass resignation of the Congress 
Jinnah urged South Asian Muslims to celebrate December, 22 as a Day of Deliverance from the 
oppression of Congress rule.32 He tried to transform the Congress’s protest against the British 
into a Muslim opportunity to revolt against political domination and so avoid being marked as a 
colonial sympathizer. He understood that the appearance of support for imperialism would 
                                                          
30 Reel 47, IOR NEG 10806, Anonymous to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, August 14, 1942. Capital in original. 
31 Reel 15, IOR NEG 10774, Jawaharlal Nehru to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, December 16, 1939. 
32 Mushirul Hasan, "Partition Narratives," Social Scientist 30, no. 7/8 (2002): 16. 
Harrell 17 
 
contradict the League’s mission as an independence organization and took actions to combat this 
perception.33 
However while Jinnah had crafted a response to the main criticism of wartime support 
from those outside the League, accusations from within the organization also posed a problem. 
Some claims were similar to those made by his opponents in the Congress, namely that the 
League was shirking its duty as an independence party by supporting the British. Jinnah’s 
response to such claims, apparent in intraleague correspondence, was to emphasize the political 
benefits of support, thus changing the narrative from supporting a colonial power to building the 
League’s power.34 In many ways this mirrors his response to Congress criticisms and both tactics 
appear to have mitigated—if not eliminated—such attacks. League members responded to 
Jinnah’s justifications, since they were well aware of the League’s electoral failings. Thus while 
they may not have wanted to support the British, Jinnah’s assurance that such support was purely 
for political benefits assuaged their concerns. 
 Yet concerns over the League’s relationship to colonialism were not the only criticisms; 
many of the Leaguers complained about the British granting insufficient concessions in exchange 
for their support. In a 1939 letter, the legislative assembly of Bengal told Jinnah that they 
(Bengali Assembly) would support him and pass the war resolutions if Muslim demands were 
met.35 However it mentions that in the Punjab legislature the resolutions had already been passed 
without a need for guarantees on demands and that in Bengal minority figures had voiced their 
objections regardless of benefits gained for supporting the war. Other documents also show this 
                                                          
33 Reel 17, IOR NEG 10776, Muhammad Ali Jinnah to Qazi Muhammad Essa, July 14, 1941. 
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debate over support for the war and skepticism of British concessions. In one illuminating 
example, a member, Maulana Mohani, tendered his “resignation from the Presidentship of the 
League” because he felt that the League was supporting the British with no concrete benefits 
guaranteed.36 
Initially, Jinnah asserted that the League was not blindly supporting the British but rather 
was offering support in return for concessions.37 Yet he did not immediately address his allies’ 
disagreements over what should be included among the concessions, which they emphasized in 
the letters to Jinnah—letters that underscore the disparate needs of the Muslims throughout the 
subcontinent. Arguments for additional demands were often based in personal experiences but 
had broader implications. One correspondent complained about the pay disparity that he 
perceived between Muslims and Hindus serving in the British military.38 Other Leaguers insisted 
that no concessions were necessary, since it was the League’s duty to oppose Nazi fascism 
regardless of benefits received.39 The inter-League concern over concessions was thus 
problematic for Jinnah as a broad response from him could not address each individual worry. 
Inundated by letters and telegrams from Muslims across the subcontinent, Jinnah could 
not reply to all of these concerns. However, the documents demonstrate that Jinnah, while not 
directly referring to such individual requests, sometimes referenced these new demands. One 
draft resolution, passed by several organizations including the League, states that while there 
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should be concessions to Indian organizations that supported the war, all Indians still had a moral 
duty to support the war as a fight against fascism.40  
Even though Jinnah was willing to let the League sign such a resolution, it is unclear 
whether this placated dissatisfied Leaguers. Ultimately, Jinnah seems to have tried to ignore 
complaints about the concessions from those within the League and hoped that by occasionally 
incorporating some individual demands he could maintain support. Of course this was aided by 
the fact that internal League critics were predominantly lower ranked members. Unlike the 
Congress criticism, which came from high-ranking leaders such as Nehru, there is no convincing 
evidence that other League leaders publicly opposed the decision to support England. Why this is 
the case is hard to determine but it is likely due to the fact that League decisions were approved 
by the working committee which would provide an opportunity to parse out debate among the 
most senior members. League leadership also likely realized the necessity of supporting the 
British due to the political weakness of the organization. Jinnah managed to maintain enough 
support within the League to further his plans. 
The Early Demands 
Jinnah reaped the political rewards that came with concessions from the British. In their 
correspondences with the British, Jinnah and the League stressed the importance of these 
concessions. However not all demands reflected the same motivations. In early lists of demands, 
many of the most important concessions were motivated by a desire to achieve political 
representation and determination for the League. Yet other goals appear in the demands too. In 
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particular, Jinnah felt a duty to the wider Islamic world to demonstrate concern for Arabs in 
Palestine.41  
 The earliest reference to concessions in exchange for supporting the war appear in a 
publication by the League on September 17, 1939. This document resulted from an emergency 
meeting among League leaders to discuss the announcement of Indian involvement in WWII. In 
the declaration, the League urges the British to adopt three practices in return for the League’s 
wartime support: 
1. No decision regarding the future of India should be made without approval of the League. 
2. The British should “take into its confidence” the League, which should be seen as the 
only representative of Muslim India. 
3. The British should satisfy the demands of the Arab National in Palestine.42 
 These three requests reveal core principles. The first speaks to the idea of political 
determination while the second demand deals with political representation. The final point 
reveals Jinnah’s relation to the broader Muslim world and a duty he felt towards his fellow 
Muslims. These initial demands reveal the complex mix of League goals: the third demand is 
starkly different from the first two. 
Political determination and representation are shorthand for common themes present in 
League sources discussing concessions: first, the right of the League to participate in designing 
the future constitution of India after the end of the British Raj, and second, British recognition of 
the League as sole representative of South Asian Muslims. While neither of these terms are 
found in the correspondences of Jinnah or the League, the ideas are perennially present. 
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 In 1940, the League’s central committee, the governing body of the entire party, issued a 
decree that asserted that the League would support the war effort so long as it was included in 
discussions regarding India’s future and allowed to be the sole representative for the interests of 
Muslims in the subcontinent.43 Guarantees that the League could help create the future 
constitution of free India and act as the political representative of South Asian Muslims would 
buy the organization the time and power it needed to craft a Muslim identity among the 
electorate so that it could actually win elections. Meanwhile, concessions that secured the right 
of the League to represent all Muslims would provide Jinnah with justifications that he would 
need for later political goals. The two-nation theory in particular would benefit from the idea of 
representation.44 Jinnah emphasized political self-determination and representation to win 
support for the League in the short term and protect the group’s future. 
 The third request in the September 17 documents relates to a wholly separate question of 
the fate of Muslims living in Palestine. A later chapter will explore Jinnah’s Muslim faith in 
detail, but here it is important to briefly address the religious context of the League’s interest in 
British policy in Palestine. 
 In the 1939 emergency meeting declaration the third demand states that the British should 
meet the requirements of the Arab Nationals in Palestine.45 At the time, colonial powers were 
debating the future of the region after the dissolution of Mandatory Palestine. This declaration is 
likely referring to the White Paper of 1939, a policy passed by the British Parliament several 
months prior to WWII dealing with the governance of Mandatory Palestine. Importantly, this 
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paper stated that within ten years an independent Palestine would be created, in which Jews and 
Arabs would share governing responsibilities, and that Jewish immigrations into Palestine would 
receive a limit for the next five years after which further Jewish immigration would need to 
receive Arab permission.46 
The reaction from Muslims in Palestine to the document was quite negative.47 Yet the 
motivation for the League interfere is unclear. Jinnah deploys language that indicates that he felt 
a kinship to the wider Muslim world; in a letter to the viceroy he included himself as a part of 
the, “eyes of the Muslim world watching the situation (in Palestine) keenly.”48 This use of pan-
Islamic language is important as the entire concept of a pan-Islamic world was a tool used by 
colonized Muslims to give weight to their demands. Thus while the League might only represent 
a minority in the subcontinent, by connecting the organization to Muslims from other parts of the 
British Empire Jinnah gave mare significance to his authority. He became not just a 
representative of the League but of the Muslim world. 
There were also very practical political reasons for Jinnah to want the British to resolve 
the issue in Palestine in a way that favored the Muslims. In a way, the White Paper of 1939 
exemplified Jinnah’s worry about what could happen if the British refused to listen to Muslim 
voices, and he had a political motivation to prevent the British from adopting a precedent that 
could be repeated later in India. Jinnah’s desire for parity is rather evident in the third demand as 
the League leader hopes to stave off a future where the British fully disregard the suggestions of 
the League. 
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 The 1939 demands from the League set the terms of the conversation regarding 
concessions and they remained largely unchanged during the course of the war.  
Debating Demands and their Importance 
 After the League sent its initial demands to the British, both sides began to prepare for 
negations. Over the course of the negotiations, the concessions became bargaining tools, which 
the League valued in different ways—some demands were vital, and others, Jinnah was willing 
to sacrifice. The most valued concessions, to Jinnah, dealt with the concepts of political 
representation of Muslims on the subcontinent and League influence on the future constitution of 
India. The value of such demands was derived from the political security that they provided to 
the League. 
 While the three earliest concessions expected by the League are found in the September 
17 declaration, other sources indicate that additional demands were later made. However due to a 
gap in the sources, knowing how many added demands existed is practically impossible, but later 
demands were either not in great number or of little importance. The most important additional 
demand forbade the use of Indian, Muslim troops against Muslim nations.49 This restriction on 
Muslim troops, along with the previously examined three demands, would form the crux of the 
concessions at the center of the British-League debates. 
 In a letter dated December 23, 1939 Viceroy Linlithgow openly seems to accept the 
demand for political self-determination. He acknowledged that Muslims in South Asia held an 
important position and that they were crucial to “the success of any constitutional developments 
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in India.”50 Yet in the same letter the viceroy rejected two other concessions. The first dismissed 
demand dealt with the British treatment of Palestinians which Linlithgow sweeps away by 
stating that the British will meet “reasonable demands” from the Palestinians but makes no 
concrete promises as to what this might entail.51 The other demand he refuted dealt with the use 
of Indian Muslim troops against Islamic nations. Linlithgow states, accurately, that the British 
were not at war with any Muslim powers, yet he went on to argue that even if they were this 
demand could not be reasonably granted as the demand was overly broad and would unduly 
restrict British military options including any needed to protect India. The British thus adopted 
what would be their primary negotiation strategy: they endorsed concessions related to the 
League while refusing or only vaguely acknowledging requests not related specifically to India. 
 The League’s response to Linlithgow’s letter is perhaps the most illuminating piece of 
evidence for understanding how Jinnah and his colleagues viewed the concessions. In their initial 
list of demands the League had made no distinction between the demands and all were presented 
as equally important. Yet in their reply to Linlithgow’s letter the League was surprisingly 
acquiescent. In a letter sent roughly two months after the viceroy’s reply, the League stated that 
it understood the British attitude on Palestine and use of Muslims troops.52 League acceptance of 
British dismissal of two concessions is striking, even more so given the fact that in their reply the 
League felt that the British concession on determination was not satisfactory. Stating that a 
“definite assurance” was needed, the League was openly displeased with the British stance on 
this concession.53 In effect, the League replied that they were willing to ignore two demands so 
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as to focus on the one concerning political determination. This correspondences leaves little 
doubt about Jinnah’s priorities and demonstrates that he was willing to sacrifice some demands 
to achieve those with greater value. 
 The difference in value given to the various concessions can largely be attributed to the 
practical impacts that such concessions had upon the continuation of the League. Guarantees that 
the League would represent South Asian Muslims and participate in constitutional framing 
would secure the organizations future. Jinnah stated as much in 1940 arguing that “The League is 
of the opinion that before [offering wartime support] they must feel confident that the future of 
the Musalmans of India is not left uncertain.”54 In many ways this quote sums up Jinnah’s goals 
for the wartime concessions as he both frames the League as representative of all Indian Muslims 
and articulates the need political authority in the future. 
 The League prioritized concessions that could promise the party a political future; the 
other requests were, at least in part, bargaining tools that Jinnah used to secure the more 
concessions that he valued more. In a letter from 1941 Jinnah references this idea of concessions 
as an exchange, suggesting that the British ought to remember the support that was given by the 
League and that the British should uphold the concessions in return.55 
An Unintended Gain 
 While most benefits gained from the war were the result of concessions granted to the 
League in return for support there was one notable exception. When discussing the war, Jinnah 
often referenced the newly formed relationship between the League and the British government. 
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This relationship was not an intentional goal of Jinnah or the League’s but a benefit that arose 
naturally. Jinnah attributed the relationship to the British necessity for support and it proved 
crucial as it enabled the League to garner legitimacy from its association with the British. 
 Before the war Jinnah’s interaction with the British seems to have been quite limited. 
Delivering a presidential address in Lahore Jinnah stated “It was only then [after the start of the 
war] that the viceroy realized that the Muslim League was a power… previously the Viceroy 
never thought of me [Jinnah] but of Gandhi and Gandhi alone.”56 This speech articulates the 
novelty of the newly formed relationship the League had with the British and his surprise at the 
new importance given to the League. The relationship that arose between the League and the 
British Jinnah clearly attributes to World War II. The benefits brought by such a relationship are 
obvious. As noted by Jinnah, before the outbreak of the war the only party that concerned the 
British was the Congress. The League and small provincial parties were mostly ignored in talks 
regarding the future of a free India. Yet with the refusal of the Congress to initially support the 
war, the British reached out to the League. 
 In many ways, Jinnah’s attempts to gain political representation and determination can be 
seen as ways to codify and protect the new relationship between the League and the British. 
Jinnah could observe the benefits of the association given to the Congress and understood the 
political value they brought. Such benefits mainly entailed access to British officials and had 
been elusive in the past. However by 1940, the Leagues relationship with the British had 
progressed enough to allow Jinnah solo interviews with the Viceroy as well as continual 
correspondence, benefits previously only afforded to ranking Congress members.57 The 
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relationship also provided recognition to League claims. In particular, the recognition of the 
League by the British countered the Congress claim that they represented all Indians and offered 
Jinnah’s claim of Muslims representation legitimacy. Jinnah’s desire for the League to represent 
all South Asian Muslims is well accepted and while different motives have been suggested for 
this desire it is hard to argue that Jinnah did not believe that he and the League were the best 
suited for such representation.58 Without the votes to back up this claim, the League’s association 
with the British provided clout for Jinnah.  
 However the relationship did more than just provide Jinnah and the League with 
credibility and political power, it arguably emboldened the demand for Pakistan. In Jinnah’s 
presidential address at the Lahore conference, the session at which the demand for Pakistan was 
first articulated, Jinnah spends a considerable part of his speech discussing the war and the new 
relationship with the British.59 There was obviously an association between the new concessions 
and the British-League relationship with the new objective of Pakistan. The League was no 
longer a minor party that first needed recognition. The relationship provided a safety net and 
allowed Jinnah’s party to articulate major demands like an independent Muslim state. The war 
thus emboldened the League to take more political risk by providing both new avenues for 
achievement and safeguarding. 
The War Continues 
 After the League’s failure in the 1937 elections, Jinnah was forced to search for other 
ways to ensure that the organization would have a political future. The outbreak of World War II 
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provided such an opportunity and he lead the League in offering support for the war to gain 
British concessions in return: the promise of political representation and determination, with 
which he hoped to secure the existence of the League.  
 By 1940, Jinnah had obtained the necessary guarantees to protect the League. As seen in 
the letter to Khan, Jinnah no longer felt the need to demand new concessions and instead simply 
focused on ensuring that the English followed through on their promises.60 While I have been 
unable to find a document that explicitly lists which concessions had been accepted it seems 
likely that the demands of political representation and determination had been met. A 1941 letter 
to Jinnah from an English civil servant states that the British are committed to securing 
independence for people of all, “creeds, races, and interest.”61 The League must have found such 
promises acceptable for there is no evidence of any attempts to rescind their support for the 
British. 
In many ways supporting the British paid off. The concessions bought time for the 
League until the declaration of the Lahore Resolution, which would provide the League with a 
way to begin crafting an interprovincial identity among South Asian Muslims. As the war 
dragged on Jinnah no longer needed many of the initial safeguards received from the British. The 
stage was set for Jinnah to use League support of the war to accomplish more personal goals. 
Chapter Two 
Managing Membership: Jinnah Asserts Control 
 By September of 1940, roughly a year after Viceroy Linlithgow’s declaration of India as 
a combatant in World War II, the political dynamics of the All-India Muslim League had 
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drastically changed. While not achieving all concessions, guarantees regarding political 
representation and determination were granted and the League’s political future was thus 
safeguarded. 1940 also saw the announcement of the Lahore Resolution and with it the 
beginning of the League as a truly pan-provincial organization. Although not the first demand for 
an independent Muslim state, the Lahore Resolution would have a significant impact in Jinnah’s 
position in politics.62 As Stanley Wolpert notes in his biography of Jinnah, a man once seen as an 
ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity “had totally transformed himself into Pakistan's great 
leader.”63 
 Yet Wolpert’s assertion that Jinnah turned away from attempts to craft a unified state for 
Muslims and Hindus is relatively weak part of his thesis. As Ayesha Jalal argues in her landmark 
text, The Sole Spokesman, Jinnah never truly desired to create an independent Pakistan.64 
Focused on correcting his loses in the 1937 provincial elections, Jinnah would come to realize 
that he could use the idea of Pakistan as a rallying cry to gather South Asian Muslims to his side. 
While Jinnah would ultimately lose control of the idea due to the popularity it commanded 
among South Asian Muslims, at the time the Pakistan demand functioned as a way to make 
Jinnah the “sole spokesman” for South Asian Muslims while also exaggerating his political 
might in the eyes of rival parties.65 
 Jalal’s thesis underlines the effectiveness of the Pakistan demand in uniting South Asian 
Muslims under the banner of the League. However if Jalal’s ideas are accepted then the 
concessions granted to the League at the beginning of the war lose some significance. British 
                                                          
62 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 54. 
63 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 182. 
64 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 4-5. 
65 Ibid., 60. 
Harrell 30 
 
guarantees that the League was the sole representative of subcontinent Muslims or that it should 
be involved in the framing of the constitution for future India mattered little if the party truly 
represented South Asian Muslims and won elections. Yet even as these concessions lost value 
Jinnah could not radically shift his position on the war. Not only had he led the League in 
publicly declaring support but the British still held command in India; Jinnah could hardly risk 
upsetting the nation that would likely determine the post-colonial future of India. 
 What then was Jinnah to do about League support for World War II? Given the political 
risks that Jinnah had taken to extend support for the war it is not likely that he would be willing 
to simply let this political tool fade away. It is here that a revised edition of Wolpert is 
applicable. While personally not a genuine believer in Pakistan, Jinnah adopted a public persona 
that turned away from Hindu-Muslim unity and embraced an independent Muslim state. This 
change in public image brought many problems including attacks from the Congress, confusion 
and trepidation from the British, and, most problematic, the rise of potential rivals within the 
League. To meet such challenges Jinnah once again turned to the war, hoping to use the conflict 
to increase his power over the League and eliminate potential rivals in the League. British-
created defense committees in particular became the focus of his attention as Jinnah realized that 
by regulating membership on them he could justify punishments dealt to rivals. By the mid-
1940s, Jinnah had changed his strategy. League support for World War II, previously a political 
tool for achieving party goals, became a more personal weapon as Jinnah used aspects of the war 
to increase his own power. The League President now hoped that by regulating membership in 
the British defense committees he could justify actions that would assert his authority and 
reinforce his control over the League while removing potential rivals. 
The Lahore Resolution and Associated Problems 
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 The declaration of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 was the factor that changed the 
importance of concessions and put the League in a politically precarious position. While this 
declaration would aid in coalescing South Asian Muslims into a unified electoral force, the 
proposal proved a unique problem due to its extreme nature. Congress leaders, particularly 
Nehru, vilified it as an attack on Indian unity. Gandhi, who had previously held back from 
striking out at Jinnah too often, was aghast at the idea and emerged as one of the most prominent 
critics. Within the League itself moderate members, mainly from the central provinces, worried 
about such a radical proposal while periphery provincial leaders, like Fazlul Huq and Sikandar 
Hayat Khan, saw the opportunity as a chance to increase the provincial autonomy of Bengal and 
the Punjab respectively.66 Thus the Lahore Resolution, while it presented the League a chance to 
win elections, brought with it a host of problems that Jinnah needed to address. 
 To better understand the Lahore Resolution, it is useful to first know where the idea came 
from and how it evolved. The two-nation theory, i.e., the belief that Indian Hindus and Muslims 
were separate nations, formed the bedrock of the Lahore Resolution. Such a theory was first 
propagated by Syed Ahmad Khan, an Indian Muslim philosopher. Khan had an oversized impact 
on the thinking of the League, not least due to the fact that his All India Muhammadan 
Educational Conference, established in 1886, was the forerunner of the All-India Muslim 
League.67 Yet despite the popularity and importance of Khan, his two-nation theory never 
commanded serious attention among League members except among a few individuals. The 
most notable exponent of this position was Muhammad Iqbal. The Indian Muslim poet 
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continually asserted the idea of an independent Muslim state yet politicians, for the most part, 
ignored his pleas.68 
 However, with the resounding defeat of the 1937 election, these individuals had a chance 
to propagate their ideas while Jinnah led the League on a search for potential strategies. He set 
up a special committee in 1939 to examine potential schemes that might enable the League to 
appeal to Muslim voters. Jalal is right to point out that while many such schemes had roots in the 
two-nation theory, to think of them as simply the “tattered remnants of kites flown long ago” is 
incorrect.69 The proposed ideas that were put before the committee covered a huge array of 
possibilities, ranging from Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali’s plan for a “Pakistan Commonwealth of 
Nations” Sikandar Hayat Khan’s suggestion that the Punjab should be given sovereign power 
over the northwest area of the subcontinent.70 As Jalal points out, the differences between these 
ideas shows the disparity between different individuals and what they valued in a Muslim state.71 
 Among such plans the only general agreement was the belief that Muslims were a nation 
and as a result they needed their own state. With no documents available from the committee’s 
deliberations it is impossible to see what exactly lead to the final draft. However the text 
published in 1940 ultimately reflects a slight variation on Khan’s proposal. Rather than simply 
making the Punjab independent, “the North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be 
grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and 
sovereign.”72 This quote forms the core of the Lahore Resolution, the formal political statement 
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that was created by the League Working Committee in 1940. Named for the city in which it was 
first announced, the Lahore Resolution was the first public demand by the League for an 
independent state. 
 The Lahore Resolution represents Jinnah’s new political strategy coming out of the 1937 
elections. Religious communalism drove this plan as Jinnah attempted to unify South Asian 
Muslims behind his party while also drawing voters away from provincial parties in Muslim 
majority provinces that had previously split the Muslim electorate.73 Of course notions of 
communalism had long been an aspect of Jinnah’s political thought as his primary concern had 
always been to protect the interests of South Asian Muslims. A statement by Jinnah several years 
prior to the war envisioned an Indian state in which provinces are grouped in a loose 
confederation.74 Such a plan was designed to ensure that Muslims majority provinces could 
maintain their sovereignty in the face of a Hindu majority. The Lahore Resolution continued 
Jinnah’s goal of protecting South Asian Muslims. By asserting that Muslims constitute an 
independent state the logic follows that they ought to have self-sovereignty and thus should be 
allowed to assert their interests. 
The Lahore Resolution brought with it a host of new issues. To many the mission of the 
League had fundamentally changed and Gandhi, who had previously been willing to work with 
Jinnah, publicly denounced him and the plan as a dangerous scheme.75 Since Gandhi publicly 
picked a side, the Congress could go full force in attacking the resolution. However Jinnah could 
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not have been surprised by the criticism from the Congress and for the most part it does not seem 
to have presented any major concern for the League. The true problems of the resolution came 
from within the party. Political rivals of Jinnah hoped to use the resolution for their own benefit. 
Sikandar Hayat Khan and Fazlul Huq were perhaps the most prominent League members who 
hoped to use the Lahore Resolution to strengthen their individual parties. The Unionist Party of 
Hayat Khan in the Punjab and Huq’s Krishak Praja Party in Bengal both stood to gain and this 
helps to explain why both men had supported a plan that created a confederacy, which benefitted 
their provincial specific parties, rather than a unified Muslim state. Even though these proposals 
failed to gain traction, the two politicians still used the document to rally Muslim voters to their 
parties in their respective provinces.76  
Huq and Khan’s use of the Lahore Resolution to assert their provincial parties’ agendas 
certainly upset Jinnah. In a 1941 telegram Jinnah openly accused Huq of betraying, “the former 
coalition party (of the League and the Krishak Praja Party).”77 Part of this anger was due to the 
fact that the confederacy of Muslim states envisioned by the provincial leaders mirrored the 
confederacy that Jinnah had previously articulated.78 However more importantly, the Lahore 
Resolution was intended by Jinnah to provide a platform that would gather support among South 
Asian Muslims which would enable him to defend what he believed were Muslims interests.79 
When Khan and Huq appropriated the resolution for their own provincial goals, they not only 
disrespected Jinnah but challenged the core assertion that South Asian Muslims formed a 
collective community. 
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Defense Councils and Jinnah’s Initial response 
 In 1940 the British government began to create war committees designed to gather South 
Asian officials to give their advice on the war. These advisory bodies had no real authority. They 
could not martial troops nor direct resources, and mainly served as organizations to provide the 
impression that South Asians had a say in the war.80 Interestingly, the League said little about 
such councils when they were first organized and League members did join them; notably a 
disproportionate number of Punjabis signed on as members.81 Yet some time in the summer of 
1940 the League, at the direction of Jinnah, published a directive ordering all members to not 
join such boards and to resign from them if already a member. Soon, Jinnah was swamped by 
letters pleading for an alternative path that would allow League members to maintain their 
membership on the councils. Some ranking League members even claimed, contrary to Jinnah, 
that such alternatives existed. However despite such problems Jinnah’s attitude toward the 
boards remained one of relative indifference and 1940 saw Jinnah largely unconcerned and 
apathetic towards the committees. 
 The early war advisory boards, as they were called by the British, functioned almost 
exactly as the name implies: small organizations scattered around the subcontinent that were 
open to educated South Asians. Local and provincial elites made up the bulk of such committees 
with several, notably the Viceroy’s National Defense Council, being created solely for high 
ranking South Asian political leaders. Such councils existed as both ways to disseminate news 
reports about the war while also helping the British gauge Indian attitudes regarding the course 
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of the conflict. In the case of boards reserved for high ranking officials, the councils also served 
as a forum for such individuals to provide their input on the war to the British. 
 How the League felt about the defense councils when they first began appearing is hard 
to judge. In a letter to Jinnah dated June 24, 1940, one author apologized for his and other 
Punjabis’ membership on a war committee.82 The author argued that a statement by Jinnah in a 
local newspaper on May 28 led “even the really genuine and enthusiastic members of the League 
to believe that there would be nothing wrong if they agreed to serve on the war committee.”83 
While what Jinnah said is not included, this implication of relative indifference is also found in 
an August 7 letter that accuses Jinnah of appearing indecisive about the matter of defense 
committee membership, and therefore creating confusion regarding the League’s position on 
such councils.84 
 Although letters such as these imply that the League had not committed to a concrete 
position regarding war committees early, it is important to observe that both have an obvious 
agenda. Both letters, written after the League explicitly stated that Leaguers should not 
participate on defense councils, argue that Jinnah should compromise on the issue and find ways 
to allow individuals to serve on committees while remaining League members. Such motives 
would give the writers cause to portray Jinnah’s past actions as indecisive, so that their 
membership on the defense committees would be more understandable. 
 Evidence from other sources indicates that there truly was confusion regarding the 
League’s position over defense councils. An article clip from a newspaper written in July of 
1940 states that while Jinnah did not waver in his desire to have League members leave defense 
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councils, a statement by the Punjabi Premier Sikandar Hayat Khan caused confusion. According 
to the article the premier stated that Punjabi and Bengali ministers were allowed to serve on 
defense councils in their capacity as ministers.85 If this statement was accurate than figures like 
Hayat Khan and Huq would have been allowed to serve on the councils as they both were 
provincial premiers. The confusion surrounding this statement would have been considerable. 
Not only was Hayat Khan a ranking politician and whose words carried weight, but the 
vagueness of his statement could be interpreted as allowing any League member who was 
serving in a provincial position an exemption from Jinnah’s decree. 
The Secretary of the Muslim League, Liaquat Ali Khan, later stated that, “not only the 
Muslim ministers of the Punjab and Bengal are exempted but also those of Sind and Assam.”86 
This statement by Ali Khan is also referenced in another newspaper written around the same 
time providing evidence that such decrees, contrary to Jinnah’s goals, were widely published.87 
 Such articles give some credence letter writers’ complaints of confusion regarding the 
League’s position on war committees, though such confusion does not appear to be the result of 
Jinnah’s indecisiveness. Interestingly, these complaints of confusion also point toward early 
tensions between Jinnah and his rivals. Ranking members of the League did attempt to strike a 
middle position between Jinnah’s refusal to allow Leaguers onto the defense committees and a 
desire to aid in the war that was apparently intensely felt among certain populations of South 
Asian Muslims like the Punjabis. This middle path not only enabled provincial leaders like Huq 
and Hayat Khan to appeal to popular sentiment in their provinces; it provided them a chance to 
challenge Jinnah and assert their own independence. 
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 Jinnah’s reaction to these early moves by his opponents seems remarkably measured. In a 
letter sent on June 29th 1940 to a Punjabi official named Ismail, Jinnah clarified that he did not 
want any League members to serve on defense councils. However instead of raging at those who 
had joined such councils he simply stated that they must resign and to “do so without delay.”88 
This response is mirrored in the July newspaper article. The paper reports that Jinnah simply 
issued a statement that clarified the League’s official position and no further repercussions are 
mentioned.89 Furthermore, in both of the letters sent to Jinnah, neither of the correspondents 
seemed concerned with possibly upsetting Jinnah by inquiring about potential exemptions. One 
was even so bold as to suggest a potential resolution to Jinnah that would authorize such 
exceptions.90 Ali Khan, the secretary of the League who publicly contradicted Jinnah, did not 
lose his position or even seem to suffer any consequences. It is fairly apparent that Jinnah was 
not overly concerned with people arguing or even opposing his position on the defense councils 
during the summer of 1940. 
 A letter sent to Jinnah on July 16, 1940 underlines the fact that the League President was 
not terribly upset over Leaguers, membership in defense councils. This letter, from the 
aforementioned official Ismail, appears to be part of a regular correspondence with Jinnah.91 In 
the letter the author discusses how the Provincial Muslim League Working Committee of Bihar 
passed a resolution that ratified Jinnah’s position on defense councils. The resolution further 
authorizes the Bihar provincial president, apparently the author of the letter, to take disciplinary 
action with regards to any Leaguers who retain membership on defense councils.92 However, the 
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League did not establish a set date by which this must be accomplished nor suggest a punishment 
for those who disobeyed the order. Ismail was essentially left on his own to determine the best 
way to deal out punishments, a fact that caused him “to seek your [Jinnah] guidance.”93 That 
Jinnah had not even set a date by which League members must resign from the defense councils 
nor imposed a punishment for defying the order is indicative of his rather relaxed attitude about 
the whole affair. 
 In 1940 the League issued orders that all members needed to resign from British defense 
councils. However no time limit or punishment was set out and in many cases ranking League 
officials offered compromises that directly contradicted Jinnah. However through it all Jinnah 
seemed rather unhurried and no direct action, by the national League committee that Jinnah 
headed, seems to have be taken against League members who maintained their membership on 
defense councils. Jinnah’s attitude toward the British defense councils was thus one of 
disapproval, but a willingness to ignore in favor of other issues. 
The Removal of Fazlul Huq and Jinnah’s Change 
 Jinnah’s unconcerned attitude over League members’ service on defense councils would 
not last and nowhere is the change in his attitude more apparent than in his expulsion of Fazlul 
Huq from the League. When the 67 year-old Bengali politician joined the Viceroy’s Defense 
Council, Jinnah publicly and brutally berated the former ally. However while Jinnah was 
demonizing Huq and kicking him out of the organization, he had only a year previously been 
willing to entertain requests from other League members who wished to serve on the British 
defense committees. Huq’s removal from the League suggests that Jinnah had come to see 
defense councils as a way to control League members and eliminate rivals. 
                                                          
93 Reel 17, IOR NEG 10776, Ismail to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, July 16, 1940. 
Harrell 40 
 
 This idea likely had been in his head for a while. In the 1940 letter from Ismail, the writer 
references an earlier letter by Jinnah in which the leader stated that “the time has come when the 
League should be purified.”94 If Ismail is accurate in attributing this quote to Jinnah, than it is 
apparent that Jinnah did have an idea of restructuring the League to increase his own authority. 
The use of the word “purified” is particularly notable as it carries a connotation that implies 
Jinnah’s desire was to eliminate ideas that competed against his own. 
 The first major step of Jinnah’s plan to restructure the League was his 1941 removal of 
Fazlul Huq from the All-India Muslim League. Although Huq had been a valuable partner to the 
League ever since he had formed a coalition government with it in Bengal, the elder statesman 
had never been a reliable ally. As Sana Aiyar notes, Huq saw himself as a distinct entity from the 
League, offering a third path for Bengalis that was different from the League and the Congress.95 
In the process of enacting this vision, Huq often opposed Jinnah, as in 1940 when Jinnah rebuked 
Huq and Punjabi Premier Skinader Hyatt Khan for engaging in talks with the Congress that he 
had not authorized.96 This willingness to act independently without respecting Jinnah’s authority 
had posed a continual source of friction between Jinnah and Huq, setting the stage for a split. 
 The spark for Huq’s removal was a relatively innocuous letter from the Indian Viceroy. 
In 1941 Huq received the request to serve on the Viceroy’ Defense Council in his capacity as the 
premier of Bengal.97 Despite the fact that by this point Jinnah’s position on this matter was quite 
well established, Huq decided to strike out on his own and accepted the invitation. Jinnah’s 
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reaction to the news was belligerent, accusing Huq of “gross misconduct” purposefully 
calculated to harm the League, Bengalis, and “Muslim India generally.”98 A telegram on 
December 6, 1941 from Jinnah to Huq states that Huq’s, “conduct amounts to treachery.”99 
While there are few third-party sources on Jinnah’s reaction to the news, one telegram described 
Jinnah as having a “fearsome anger.”100 
For his part Huq remained steadfast in his claims that he was still a loyal member of the 
League. In a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan he asserted that his “loyalty to the League is 
unshaken” and that he wished to remain a member of the League.101 However such claims did 
not pacify Jinnah. When Huq refused to apologize for his actions or make any effort to leave the 
Viceroy’s council, the League President took action. In early December, Jinnah gave Huq four 
days to explain himself and leave the Viceroy’s Council or have further action taken.102  Yet Huq 
took no action and on December 10th Jinnah revoked Huq’s status as a member of the League. 
 Huq’s expulsion marked a stark departure from Jinnah’s earlier reactions to those who 
opposed his plan for the defense councils. The fierce language that he invoked to criticize Huq, 
calling him a traitor with an intent to harm, is absent in earlier statements on the committees.103 
Granted Huq was a notable person, he had delivered the Lahore Resolution and was a dominant 
figure in Bengali politics. But so too were Ali Khan and Hayat Khan who had opposed Jinnah’s 
stance on defense councils just a year previously. Stanley Wolpert uses episodes like this to 
argue that Jinnah was highly motivated by pride and could not stand to be challenged.104 Yet 
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Jinnah had been willing to show leniency toward Leaguers who had retained membership just a 
year prior. The change in Jinnah’s reaction to Huq’s disobedience is thus best explained by his 
newfound desire to purify the League. Huq and his continual disobedience presented a rogue 
element that Jinnah needed to expel and the defense council offered a useful justification. 
Challenges to Authority 
 Fazlul Huq’s removal was an attempt by Jinnah to solidify his control over the League. 
Huq’s acceptance of the viceroy’s invitation was more than a case of a premier simply acting in 
the best interests of his citizens; to Jinnah it was a public challenge to his authority. The 
introduction of the Lahore Resolution had changed the position of the League in Indian politics 
by opening the party to not only new criticism from outside groups like the Congress, but also by 
providing a platform to figures like Huq, who desired to increase provincial autonomy. To ensure 
that the League was not torn apart by such criticism and infighting, Jinnah began purging the 
League of those who he felt challenged his authority. Jinnah’s anger was not over Huq’s 
membership on an admittedly pointless council, rather it was the excuse he needed to eliminate a 
bold challenger. 
 In a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan, Huq complained about Jinnah’s decision to centralize the 
League and even pointed out that he (Huq) might be on the chopping block as he was more 
concerned with Bengal than the entire subcontinent.105 Jinnah’s decision to remove members was 
thus, as Sana Aiyar points out, an attempt to solidify his authority over the League. As Aiyar 
notes, Huq’s focus on provincial politics presented a threat to Jinnah’s religious communalism 
that he desired to be the base of his party.106 While early in his political life Jinnah was able to 
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successfully navigate such challenges, the announcement of the Lahore Resolution codified 
Jinnah’s communalism and forced him to more fiercely defend challenges to it. Hayat Khan had 
previously opposed Jinnah’s position on defense councils and had argued that Jinnah should 
allow provincial politicians like himself the ability to serve on such organizations. In fact, Hayat 
Khan, like Huq, was a provincial premier and led a provincial party that was focused on the 
Punjab. Hayat Khan had even joined the Viceroy’s Defense Council with Huq in 1941.107 
However when called to step down from the council he did so, thus submitting to Jinnah’s 
authority and avoiding the fate of Huq. 
 Aiyar’s theory thus helps to explain why Jinnah’s reaction to Huq was so extreme, but it 
is incomplete. Notably, her theory does little to explain why Jinnah tolerated Huq’s challenges 
for so long and only reacted when the Bengali joined the defense council. If, as Aiyar suggests, 
Jinnah became more sensitive to challenges to his authority after the Lahore Resolution, then he 
should have acted against Huq in 1940 when the provincial leader entered into talks with the 
Congress. Jinnah’s decision to only remove Huq after he had joined the defense council is a 
testament to Huq’s popularity and helps explain why Jinnah framed Huq’s membership on the 
council. 
 The popularity of Huq was undeniable. Not only had he managed to lead a third party 
into the government in Bengal but his actions taken as premier had further endeared him to large 
segments of the Muslim population, particularly in Bengal.108 To remove the potential rival, 
Jinnah needed a public grievance with which he could justify his decision to bring Huq down. In 
an article from 1941 Huq seems to be aware of this fact; as he told a reporter (Jinnah was) 
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“anxious to make a public exhibition of his authority.”109 While not directly talking about the 
defense council or even himself, Huq suggests that Jinnah was seeking a way to reassert his 
authority by making a public move. The fact that Jinnah was seeking to make a public example 
of Huq, might initially seem strange considering Huq’s popularity. However Jinnah’s logic was 
likely that the often outspoken Huq would be unwilling to go quietly and Jinnah’s alternative 
was to publicly disgrace his opponent. 
 Because Huq’s membership on the Viceroy’s Defense Council was public knowledge it 
presented the perfect opportunity for Jinnah to assert his authority and reinforce his position as 
head of the League. Of course Jinnah’s previous tolerance of League members participating in 
British defense committees presented a potential problem and this explains why his 
denouncements of Huq carry so much reference to treachery, he hoped to frame Huq as a traitor 
and differentiate his action from other League members who had joined such councils.110 The 
nonexistent powers of the councils made them relative nonfactors in the political landscape of 
South Asian politics and Jinnah thus had to imbue Huq’s membership on the council with greater 
meaning than it practically presented. 
All Alone: The Hegemony of Jinnah 
 The use of defense councils to neutralize Jinnah’s rivals established him as the dominant 
figure in the League. Yet in centralizing power, Jinnah was also removing competing ideologies 
from the League. In attempting to solidify his control over the League Jinnah managed to make 
the organization more homogeneous in ways that impacted the organizations future demand of 
Pakistan. 
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 Jinnah’s refusal to state what he envisioned Pakistan to actually entail is the crux of 
Ayesha Jalal’s thesis in The Sole Spokesman.111 Aside from a basic assertion of South Asian 
communalism that was based around Muslims, Jinnah often demurred from articulating his exact 
vision of the state. However Huq and Hayat Khan were quite different with both articulating 
strong visions of Pakistan. Hayat Khan notably opposed partition, instead arguing for a Muslim 
majority region as part of a larger Indian confederation.112 While Huq supported the idea of an 
independent Muslim state, his vision was often couched in themes of provincial autonomy that 
undermined the centrality inherent to the League.113 The two provincial leaders thus offered 
notable departures from Jinnah and presented visions that were designed to appeal to their 
respective provinces of the Punjab and Bengal. 
 It would be wrong to assume that Jinnah tried to neutralize Hayat Khan and Huq because 
of their assertions about Pakistan. As Jalal argues, Jinnah wanted the disparate Muslim 
populations of the subcontinent to see what they wished in the idea of Pakistan thereby uniting 
the provinces under the League banner.114 If this thesis were true, Jinnah would presumably have 
welcomed Huq and Hayat Kahn’s varying views on Pakistan as they would entice specific 
provincial groups into the League. In fact, there is no reflection by Jinnah on differing visions of 
Pakistan when discussing the matter. In a letter to Shah Nawaz Khan, a leading Punjabi Leaguer, 
Jinnah simply states that his goal with regarding defense councils is simply to “see that the 
Resolution of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League is obeyed” and discusses 
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his willingness to accept members who follow this simply rule.115 It thus seems their views on 
Pakistan were incidental and that Jinnah’s use of defense councils against them mainly stemmed 
from their challenges to his authority. 
 However while ideology did not motivate Jinnah’s actions regarding the war councils, the 
overall League ideology was certainly impacted. The expulsion of Huq and the untimely death of 
Hayat Khan only a year later would remove two major influences that could have competed with 
Jinnah’s attempts to frame the Lahore Resolution. This episode of the League also enforced a 
clear hierarchy for the organization with the Working Committee of the League, under the 
leadership of Jinnah, superior to all members even those who had dual membership in provincial 
parties. This fact fits well with the work of people like Christophe Jaffrelot who argue that 
Pakistan’s formation was in part a result of the domination of elite North Indian Muslims within 
the League.116 In Jinnah’s subjugation of rogue elements that challenged his authority, the 
League president subjugated potential third paths. In doing so he unknowingly solidified the 
hegemony of thinkers like himself, western-educated Islamic modernists, at the vanguard of the 
League. 
During the course of the conflict, Jinnah continued to use World War II to enact political 
goals. However unlike the leveraging of support for the war to receive concessions from the 
British government for the entire League, Jinnah used the British defense councils for a slightly 
more selfish goal. The announcement of the Lahore Resolution presented Jinnah with a new 
avenue by which political opponents could attack the League. To respond Jinnah had to present 
the party as a unified whole that was tightly under his control. In achieving this goal the League 
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president used British defense councils as a way to control, and even remove, those who 
challenged his authority. 
 
The four important figures for this chapter. From left to right are A.K. Fazlul Huq, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat 
Ali Khan, and Sikandar Hayat Khan. This photo is from a Muslim League Council Meeting in Bombay.117 
 
Chapter Three 
Independence and Ideology: Islamic modernism and Identity 
 As the war drew to a close, the correspondence of the All-India Muslim League and 
Jinnah increasingly turns away from the war and a focus on the future of a free India. This is 
unsurprising considering that the British promise to hold conferences on the termination of the 
Raj. In addition, the League’s declaration of support for an independent Muslim state likely 
urged Jinnah and leading League’s members to create a coherent and unified platform for future 
negotiations. Interestingly, with the surrender of Germany in May of 1945, the war effectively 
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ended for the Muslim League. References to it vanish almost entirely from the correspondence. 
Japans’ surrender, only four months later, is not mentioned by Jinnah or any other League 
members. 
 On the surface, this might seem strange to the casual observer. Japan is not only closer to 
India than Germany but during the war Japan had actively claimed India as a member of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This platform was based on ideas of pan-Asian unity 
and promoted the cultural and economic unity of East, Southeast, and South Asian nations. Such 
assertions however have received criticism from historians who argue that the concept simply 
acted as method of asserting Japanese superiority and dominance.118 The idea never gained much 
traction in mainland India and the influence it had among the general South Asian population is 
dubious.119 To Jinnah and the League, the more worrisome opponent was the more remote one.  
To explain their view of wartime threats, it is important to consider the ideological 
background. In Chapters 1 and 2, I made the case that Muslim League support for the war is 
largely attributable to Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s strategy to both secure the political future of the 
League and to increase his control over the organization. However it is important to zoom out 
and take a broad look at the context in which Jinnah came to political maturity. The most 
important ideology that must be understood is Islamic modernism. This movement, which 
merges the Islamic faith with notions of Western political values, had an oversized impact on the 
thinking of Jinnah and other important League leaders. This ideological framework helps explain 
the actions of the League throughout the war as Islamic Modernism enabled Jinnah to achieve 
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his goals by relying on the already constructed ideology. Western influences and Islamic 
modernism made Jinnah and the League open to supporting the British and provided moral 
justification for their wartime support. However in using Islamic Modernism to explain and 
justify the war, Jinnah solidified the hegemonic dominance of elite ideology within the League. 
Islamic modernism and Syed Ahmad Khan 
 Islamic modernism was a part of the League’s formulation, and shaped members’ appeals 
to a common unity with democratic nations and their disdain for fascism. Such appeals reflect 
core tenets of 1940s South Asian Islamic modernism and were directly inspired by earlier 
Islamic Modernists. The most important figure was Syed Ahmad Khan who, through the creation 
of schools and his own public work, propagated Islamic Modernist ideas that were used by 
Jinnah and the League. 
Islamic modernism is best defined by Muhammad Qasim Zaman when he suggests that 
Islamic modernism stresses changing Islamic norms and institutions to “align them more closely 
with both the spirit of Islam and current needs and sensibilities of society.”120 This definition 
expresses the basic understanding of Islamic modernism while also avoiding problematic notions 
of Islamic backwardness. However for the purpose of this paper, it is important to keep in mind 
that the understanding of Islamic modernism during World War II would have openly accepted 
Islamic backwardness. Attempts to achieve “modernity” through Western forms of education and 
political structure were how Jinnah and the League conceived of Islamic Modernism. This is not 
particularly surprising as such an ideology would have fit well into colonial beliefs and by 
advocating to the British under the banner of Islamic Modernism, colonized Muslims could 
efficiently make demands that the colonizers would understand. 
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Syed Ahmad Khan was a major influence on modernist ideology particularly in South 
Asia. His attempts to promote Western-style education among Muslim communities lead him to 
form the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference in 1886, the forerunner of the League. 
Khan’s efforts to promote education based on Western models would gain significant traction 
among Muslim elite, a fact that is not surprising given that his concern over education arose from 
his fear that Muslim gentry were not staying current to the times. As Shamim Akhtar notes, one 
of Ahmad Khan’s earliest speeches on education was to a group of Muslim gentry on the 
importance of teaching English to their children so that they could interact with, and ultimately 
secure jobs within, the British administration.121 Due to his success in convincing such elites, it is 
not all together surprising that many on the League’s executive committee had either been 
educated in England, like Jinnah, or had attended the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, an 
institution formed by Ahmad Khan to offer a western-style education for Muslims in the 
subcontinent. While the League was never a homogeneous organization, in its early years, it had 
a decidedly modernist slant among the ranking members, almost all of whom were from elite 
Muslim families and made this prevalence of Islamic modernism even further widespread. 
Ahmad Khan’s work as a modernist was inherently political and it is unsurprising that he 
had a large impact upon the political thinking of South Asian Muslims, particularly in the 
formation of Muslim nationalism in India.122 His work helped to lay the groundwork for South 
Asian Muslim nationalism and his usage of the phrase “our nation” is an explicit and obvious 
example of how Khan viewed Muslims as a distinct group.123 Ahmad Khan’s interest in politics 
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was thus based on this very idea of Muslim distinctiveness and much of his political work 
attempted to protect Muslims from the domination of a Hindu majority. This guiding principle 
appeared in an 1887 speech in Lucknow: the Muslim intellectual attacks the idea of allowing 
Indians to vote for a representative on the Viceroy’s Council. Ahmad Khan states that this would 
not truly be an equal share of power as Hindus so greatly outnumber Muslims that “there will be 
four votes for the Hindu to every one vote for the Mahomedan.”124 Importantly, Ahmad Khan 
did not argue for a superiority but rather parity between Hindus and Muslims. As has been noted 
by scholars like Jaffrelot, Ahmad Khan’s metaphors of Hindus and Muslims as the two eyes of 
India reflect early attempts to promote a distinct, but equal, relationship between the two 
religions.125 Ahmad Khan thus took Islamic Modernist ideas like democracy but framed them in 
certain ways for his own political advantage. 
 The framework for many of Ahmad Khan’s ideas is based upon conflict between two 
irreconcilable poles. This conflict provides urgency to his claims while also giving them a 
rhetorical boost. The conflicts that Ahmad Khan discusses are wide ranging but the most 
common one is the perceived rift between the Muslims of South Asia and Hindus (for which he 
sometimes substitutes the Bengalis as a specific example). In a speech in Meerut in 1888, Khan 
references this inevitability of conflict between the two groups: “It is necessary that one of them 
should conquer the other.”126 What is important is not the attitude that Ahmad Khan expresses 
towards Hindus but rather his ideas of conflict in which opposed forces clash forcefully. In 
framing the conflict as an inevitability, Ahmad Khan removes the possibility for reconciliation. 
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Such vocabulary would prove uniquely useful to his ideological descendants as it would be 
valuable in articulating demands of Muslim nationalism. 
 The last aspect of Ahmad Khan’s legacy that is important to understand is his views on 
the British government. In many ways Ahmad Khan was a supporter of Muslim loyalty to the 
British Raj; he founded the United Patriotic Association, which aimed to foster closer relations 
between Muslims and the colonial government. Speeches and lectures by the modernist thinker 
too carry many open references to such colonial loyalty. A rather notable example appeared in a 
speech at Lucknow when Ahmad Khan hypothesized how loyally he would serve the Raj if made 
the Viceroy and ending with a call for all Indians to “to do what he can to strengthen the 
Government of Her Majesty the Queen.”127  
However Ahmad Khan did not blindly follow the Raj as seen in his book The Causes of 
the Indian Revolt. An examination of the 1857 revolt, Ahmad Khan puts the blame upon the 
British for not allowing Indians to serve upon the Legislative Council.128 In truth much of 
Ahmad Khan’s colonial support was likely influenced by political realities. The 1887 Lucknow 
speech is primarily concerned with critiquing demands from the Indian National Congress which 
had just been founded in 1885. It would not be wholly wrong to say that Ahmad Khan’s work to 
promote colonial support could be seen as an attempt to prevent the spread and popularization of 
Congress ideas, which he viewed as dangerous for South Asian Muslims. Therefore Ahmad 
Khan did promote ideas of support for the British but did so while in conversation with outside 
forces like the Congress. 
Remembering Modernists 
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 Historians almost fully agree that Jinnah and ranking members of the League subscribed 
to modernists beliefs. I believe that Khan’s ideas clearly influenced their way of thinking about 
the war and helped provide ways for justifying wartime support. The most striking evidence for 
this can be seen in Jinnah and other League members’ vocabulary and motifs that echoed Ahmad 
Khan when discussing the war. Importantly Jinnah never made Islamic Modernist arguments in 
conversation with British officials and in public statements, only with adhering Muslims. Among 
League members themselves, he relied on common notions of Islamic modernism to justify and 
articulate his support for the war. 
 Historians of the League and Islamic modernism have argued that most senior League 
members followed modernist beliefs. Indeed as Ali Usman Qasmi notes all of the “power elite” 
which included the entire executive committee as well as most bureaucratic members could be 
defined as Islamic Modernists.129 This reality can be attributed to two important aspects of the 
League. The first is the education of the leading members who were overwhelmingly instructed 
in England or Western-modeled schools.130 At such institutions the students were exposed to 
Western political theorists like John Stuart Mill and John Locke, whose ideas meshed well with 
the synthesis of Islam and Western theory promoted by Ahmad Khan.131 The second reason for 
the modernism of the League is the relative absence of any Ulema in the organization. Ulema are 
interpreters of Islamic doctrine and law who have typically received their education at a 
traditional religious institution. These men, having been educated in a profoundly different 
environment, would not have been educated in the modernist ideals espoused by so many League 
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leaders and would have brought conflicting interpretations of Islam and politics. However most 
Ulema remained aloof from the League, preferring to be supportive of Congress attempts to end 
colonial rule, and enabled the League to operate under a modernist vision relatively 
uncontested.132 
The League’s modernist tendencies abound in letters discussing World War II. Khan 
Bahadur S.M. Ismail, president of the Bihar chapter of the League, famously stated that it was a 
human duty to support the British as they represented democracy in the face of German and 
Italian fascism.133 In an unmarked letter sent around 1940, the author argued that supporting the 
British was natural for Muslims as they should be “opposed to German ideologies.”134 The 
assertion that Muslims should view the war as a battle of ideologies and thus support the British 
was clearly a common belief and one that is directly inspired by Syed Ahmad Khan and his way 
of framing conflict in Islamic modernism. In framing the conflict in such a way, it is unsurprising 
that modernist Muslims would feel sympathetic to supporting the British was effort. Democracy 
was a core tenet of 1940s Islamic modernism and it was self-evident to men like Ismail that 
Muslims should support the British. 
Nowhere is the impact of Islamic modernism and Ahmad Khan more notable than in 
Jinnah’ rhetoric. In a newspaper article from 1944, Jinnah referred to himself as a “nationalist” 
and argued that the creation of Pakistan is necessary “to achieve the liberation of their (South 
Asians) country.”135 The term nationalist is vocabulary borrowed from Western thinkers and the 
assertion that South Asian Muslims constitute a nation is a direct belief of Ahmad Khan. 
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Importantly, Jinnah attributed the need for Pakistan as due to the fact that South Asian Muslims 
are a distinct nation of people who have a right to craft a state for themselves. If such an 
understanding is true then the entire Pakistan demand, a fundamental aspect of the League since 
its proposal, would be part of a modernist vision. Importantly Jinnah’ use of the term nationalist 
should not be seen as simply parroting Ahmad Khan. Unlike Ahmad Khan Jinnah often 
recognized the important differences in language, ethnicity, and territory between South Asian 
Muslims. Jinnah’s nationalism, as people like Faisal Devji have argued, was thus separate from 
previous nationalist factors and instead based upon European Enlightenment social contract 
models of a nation.136 This reflects Jinnah’s interpretation of Islamic modernism that was both 
based upon precepts from Ahmad Khan but influenced by his exposure to European thinkers 
during his education in England. 
Other documents further reflect Jinnah’s adherence to Islamic modernism. In an early 
document sent by him to the British, before the Pakistan demand, the League executive lays out a 
plan he has for creating a constitution for a free India. He insisted that groups of people have the 
right to self-determination.137 Once again Jinnah relies on vocabulary common to modernists to 
articulate his beliefs, arguing that there must be “proper representation for each community.”138 
Jinnah’s reference to Islamic Modernist ideas was apparently so common that even his peers 
commented on it. A 1939 letter from the Bengal Legislative Assembly refers to “the progressive 
elements in the League” when discussing Jinnah and his supporters.139 
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Jinnah relied often on modernist beliefs and vocabulary to propagate his vision and enact 
goals. It is not surprising that aspects of Islamic modernism appeared in his support for the war. 
A statement by the Working Committee of the League, under the direction of Jinnah, celebrated 
the British wartime concessions to recognize South Asian Muslims as a coherent group that had 
the right to self-determination.140 When criticizing the Congress for the Quit India movement 
Jinnah references minority rights, stating that the Congress was trying to coerce the British 
government into giving the Congress sole control of India.141 Minority rights recalls the 
vocabulary of Ahmad Khan and his assertions about the importance of protecting Muslims 
interests from the Hindu majority. In a 1941 letter to Isa, Jinnah lays out why the League should 
support the war. Jinnah refers to the war as an opportunity for the organization to gain the right 
to “wield authority exclusively” while also gaining a “share of the power” in forming the future 
government.142 Such terms echo modernist ideas of Ahmad Khan and his arguments over the 
importance of Muslims having a fair use of power that was not dependent upon the size of their 
population. These terms further reflect Jinnah’s concept of political parity between Hindus and 
Muslims, an idea that he had inherited from thinkers like Ahmad Khan.143 
It is not just in vocabulary that the influence of Ahmad Khan can be seen on Jinnah. At 
the 1940 Lahore meeting Jinnah gave a speech that recalled the previous speeches of Syed 
Ahmad Khan, particularly one given by Khan in 1887 in Lucknow. In his speech, Jinnah lists 
major concessions that the League has managed to gain from the British so long as the Muslims 
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of the subcontinent support the war.144 Jinnah argued that without such concessions, the Muslims 
would be, resulting “in the complete destruction of what is most precious in Islam” and a “Hindu 
Raj.”145 Jinnah’s reverence to conflict is highly reminiscent of Ahmad Khan’s arguments. While 
this supposed conflict is not usually considered an aspect of Islamic modernism, recent 
scholarship has created new connections between it and modernist ideology. Safoora Arbab, in 
Muslims Against the Muslim League, argues that Jinnah’s understanding of political power is 
based upon a “Hobbesian model of the Leviathan state as the normative form of communal 
organization” in which a community must be able to enforce its aspired to ideals.146 Jinnah thus 
uses the threat of violence to motivate South Asian Muslims in protecting their rights. While this 
view is relatively understudied it does make use of Jinnah’s exposure to Thomas Hobbes at law 
school and incorporates it into a modernist understanding of Jinnah.147 
It should be noted that modernist arguments were used only among members of the 
League. Public declarations of war are noticeably devoid of any reference to a conflict of 
ideologies in which democracy must be supported. Publicly, the League justified the war by 
appealing to the defense of India as well as the promises that the English had made for wartime 
support.148 This is rather unsurprising: Islamic modernism is a relatively elite ideology that 
carried the most capital among Muslims who had received Western style education. Non-elite 
Muslims and Hindus would not be convinced by appeals to the ideology. Indeed non-elite 
members of South Asian society would likely take offense at references to Ahmed Khan, who 
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had made quite public remarks about the importance of maintaining elite power.149 Public 
declarations of support for Western styles of politics were also politically risky ideas to promote; 
at this time Gandhi’s concept of Swaraj, which emphasized a rejection of Western political, 
economic, and educational models, was extremely popular in the subcontinent at the time and it 
could not appear that the League was attacking Gandhi’s most popular belief. 
Jinnah and Gandhi talk. Note Jinnah’s use of Western styles of fashion contrasted with Gandhi’s 
“traditional India clothing. 
 
Germany, Japan, and the end 
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The relative absence of Japan from the communications between League leaders was 
likely a result of Islamic modernism, albeit quite unintentionally. The small example of the 
absence of Japan in League concerns of the war not only demonstrates the impact that the 
ideologies examined in this chapter had upon the League’s participation in the war, it also shows 
how these ideologies combined and interacted with the more realpolitik goals examined in 
Chapters 1 and 2.  
By May of 1945, having achieved his political goals, Jinnah had no need to maintain 
support for the war and instead needed to shift his focus to the coming negotiations with the 
Congress over the future of the subcontinent. With the Lahore Resolution having helped build 
unity among the Muslims electorate, as would be seen in the 1946 provincial elections, and 
Jinnah the leader of the League, the war had lost almost all political advantages that it had 
presented initially.150 Thankfully for Jinnah it had been Germany that had been portrayed by the 
League as the fascist tyrant that must be defeated and Britain as the model of democracy that 
ought to be supported.151 When Germany surrendered, the Islamic Modernist framework that had 
been used by the League to justify the war came to an apparent resolution. With Germany 
defeated those who had made pan-Islamic based arguments were satisfied too. The countries 
referred to during such arguments were states like Egypt and Palestine who were only really 
threatened by Germany. 
Why then did Japan never receive the same treatment as Germany? By 1945 it was partly 
due to the war losing political advantage to Jinnah. Having achieved greater control over the 
League and established concessions for the organization’s future, Jinnah no longer needed the 
war. With no more gains to be had it makes sense that Jinnah would try to pull back from the 
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conflict and focus on the future of a free India. However this only explains why Japan did not 
receive demonization after the surrender of Germany and Japan had been part of the conflict 
since 1941. Japan had in fact avoided depictions of totalitarianism for the entire conflict. The use 
of ideologies like Islamic modernism can help explain this contradiction. 
Important to remember is that Islamic Modernism is an ideology that allows effective 
communication of ideas from colonized Muslims to Western states. As noted by Shamin Akhtar, 
a primary audience of Islamic Modernists in South Asia was the British government.152 By 
fusing ideas of Islamic backwardness with European concepts of politics and philosophy, Islamic 
Modernists were able to use Islamic Modernism as a vehicle. It should not be surprising then that 
when Jinnah, an Islamic Modernist, needed to use the ideology to achieve his own goals he 
selected Italy and Germany instead of Japan as his examples for comparison. While Jinnah could 
have used Islamic Modernist ideas to craft a comparison between Japan and Britain it would 
have had to contend with racial and colonial ideas of superiority. The most obvious route for 
Jinnah then was to contrast Italy and Germany as examples of anti-democratic despotism with 
Britain. 
Furthermore, modernists in the League inherited much of Ahmad Khan’s ideology 
including his ideas of ideological conflict. When justifying the war then, if Britain was to 
represent the side of liberal democracy, then Germany made the most sense as the opponent. 
Granted Britain was still at war with Japan but it had no active troops deployed in the Pacific 
theater. Thus Japan, though it could have been used by Jinnah or other Leaguers as justification 
for the war, it never was. With Germany falling in May of 1945, League members no longer had, 
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or needed, a reason to continue supporting the war for the four more months that it continued and 
Japan thus was never portrayed in the same negative manner like Germany. 
Putting it into Practice: The Solidification of Elite ideology 
 Jinnah’s use of Islamic Modernism to justify the war was a rather obvious strategy. Not 
only was this the ideology that he had been raised in and accepted but it offered a useful way for 
the League’s president to justify the war. The vocabulary of Islamic Modernism made sense to 
European powers and offered a framework that Jinnah believed could be used to convince 
hesitant forces within the party. However while Islamic Modernism did offer an effective way 
for Jinnah to advocate for his goals, by using it he finished the process of establishing elite 
ideology that had started with the removal of potential rivals. 
 The use of elite ideology would have a significant impact upon the formation of Pakistan. 
Similar to how the use of defense councils to remove rivals had inadvertently removed 
competing ideas of the future of Pakistan, Jinnah’s establishment of elite ideology would have 
unintended effects. Even though Jinnah seems to have limited the use of Islamic Modernist 
rhetoric to primarily inter-organizational communication, by relying on Islamic Modernism to 
articulate his support for the war Jinnah provided legitimacy to the ideology. More conservative 
thought, like that advocated by the Ulema, was already a fairly minor force within the League. 
By actively using Islamic Modernism Jinnah further relegated such ideologies. The 
establishment of elite ideology is a precursor to, and helps explain, Christophe Jaffrelot’s 
assertion that Pakistan arose from an elite group.153 While Jaffrelot asserts that such a group was 
a result of lasting effects of Syed Ahmad Khan’s influence on the League, it is also apparent that 
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Jinnah’s use of Islamic Modernism to articulate support for the war would create an environment 
that cemented the already elite nature of the League.  
Conclusion 
 The surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945 ended World War II and with it the 
subcontinents formal participation in global conflict. Jinnah and the League, having already 
shifted focus away from conflict and onto the coming constitution of India, redoubled their 
efforts to promote the idea of Pakistan and build political support. Such efforts were realized in 
the 1946 provincial elections. The League managed to from the government outright in Bengal, 
the Punjab, and Sind, all Muslim majority provinces. Furthermore, the League increased its total 
number of seats controlled from 106 to 425 or slightly over 25% of the total representation. This 
was a far cry from the failure in the 1937 elections and made real the organizations claim that it 
represented all South Asian Muslims. 
 Less than a year later the subcontinent would experience a cataclysmic shift as the 
Dominion of India was ended and two separate states were pulled from it. The demand of an 
independent Muslim State had been successful and the independent states of Pakistan and India 
were created. In Pakistan, Jinnah was made the first Governor-General of the newly formed 
state. During his tenure he was mainly focused setting up the new functions of state as well as 
providing aid to the millions of Muslims who had migrated across India to live in Pakistan. Like 
his time as leader of the League, Jinnah acted with powerful moves and continued his style of 
strongman, assertive leadership. But in 1948, the 71 year old leader succumbed to lifelong health 
issues and passed away on September 11. With his death, Muhammad Ali Jinnah not only left a 
power vacuum in the fledgling state, but a dangerous precedent of powerful leaders serving until 
death. 
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 Throughout this thesis I have tried to answer two questions. Why did the All-India 
Muslim League support the British in World War II and how did this support impact the party 
and by extension the creation of Pakistan. To accomplish this end I have examined the war 
chronologically, looking at the ways in which such support was articulated and justified. I have 
often described goals and motivations as political, giving a realpolitik theme to Jinnah in his 
search for parity between Muslims and Hindus. 
I have argued that Jinnah dominated the League. In this respect I have not been unique 
and have followed contemporary historiography. However my examination of how this 
dominance by Jinnah impacted the organization as a whole provides a unique view. My work 
supports Christophe Jafrelot’s argument in The Pakistan Paradox where he points out how the 
reoccurrence of hegemonic figures in the contemporary state of Pakistan is likely influenced by 
the origins of the state which he sees as a collection of elites. 
In examining the era of wartime support I have made the case that Jinnah sought to 
solidify his control by expelling potential rivals, unknowingly establishing a uniformity of 
ideology among the League elite. However with Jinnah’s death, only a short time after the 
partition, left a sizeable power vacuum that had previously been occupied by only one person. 
This was never Jinnah’s intent but an unintended consequence from the actions taken during 
World War II. My thesis provides further support for Jarrelot’s work by focusing on the 
dominant force that was Jinnah. In particular my examination of the use of defense councils and 
the unintended creation of a hegemony of ideology provides explanation for the formation of the 
elite group that Jaffrelot discusses. 
It is such unintended consequences and their impact upon the creation of Pakistan that 
give significance to this thesis. The formation of Pakistan has a historiography that often focuses 
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on the ways in which ideas, people, and circumstances came together to create the new state. 
However despite this there has been a lack of examination into the ways in which such 
circumstances were created.  Ayesha Jalal’s The Sole Spokesman exemplifies this process as she 
spends a great deal of her book examining the process by which Jinnah navigated a variety of 
competing groups. However when she discusses the circumstances that forced the creation of the 
state, her argument is unsatisfying, asserting the vague popularity of the concept of Pakistan. In 
doing so Jalal underestimates the role of the League and Jinnah. Too often the creation of 
Pakistan has been portrayed as something that happened due to forces outside of Jinnah or the 
League’s control. As the famous scholar Thomas Metcalf noted, Jalal and others like her portray 
Jinnah as “unable to control the forces.”154 
It is a significant aspect of this thesis that returns such agency to Jinnah. Aspects like the 
British-League relationship and the dominance of Islamic Modernism within the League were 
the circumstances that helped lead to Pakistan. However such circumstances were not random 
but rather unintended consequences caused by Jinnah during World War II. By recognizing this 
fact we gain a fuller understanding of the creation of Pakistan in which the circumstances that 
lead to it are properly contextualized and Jinnah’s agency is restored. This agency is relevant to 
the final goal of this thesis, correcting the political theory of realism. Jinnah offers a good case 
study for both political scientists and historians as an example of realist political theory in action. 
As a solitary figure, Jinnah had an oversized impact upon the conditions that created Pakistan, a 
notable occurrence in international politics. Jinnah shatters the conception that only states can 
play an important role by showcasing the massive impact that single figures can have. Context 
and ideology should of course not be forgotten, it is impossible to study Jinnah without looking 
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at aspects like the League and Islamic Modernism. However in writing this thesis I hope to 
encourage political scientist and historians to consider the impact that individuals can have. 
 There is one more final note that I would like to make at the very end of this thesis. 
Throughout this work I have stressed that Jinnah’s demand for Pakistan was motivated by very 
realpolitik desires of maintaining power and that the League’s support for the British help reflect 
such concerns. I believe this idea is relevant in the contemporary political climate during which 
this thesis was written. Islam and Muslims have become caricatures in political discourse and it 
is troubling to me that so many people seemingly believe that Muslims act according to some 
doctrinal mandate. Not only is this a misunderstanding of the Quran, it is an idea not borne out 
by history. Jinnah and the League were as much motivated by vague Islamic desires as Nehru 
and the Congress were by Hindu ones. Pakistan was not formed to be an Islamic state and Jinnah 
was not motivated by Islamist beliefs. Understanding these facts are not only good history but 
should help frame contemporary discourse about Muslims in ways that are more productive and 
accurate.  
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